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Abstract
2D facial identification has attracted a great amount of attention over the past
years, due to its several advantages including practicality and simple requirements.
However, without its capability to recognize a real user from an impersonator, face
identification system becomes ineffective and vulnerable to spoof attacks. With the
great evolution of smart portable devices, more advanced sorts of attacks have been
developed, especially the replayed videos spoofing attempts that are becoming more
difficult to recognize.
Consequently, several studies have investigated the types of vulnerabilities a face
biometric system might encounter and proposed various successful anti-spoofing
algorithms. Unlike spoofing detection for passive or motionless authentication methods
that were profoundly studied, anti-spoofing systems applied on interactive user
verification methods were broadly examined as a potential robust spoofing prevention
approach.
This study aims first at comparing the performance of the existing spoofing detection
techniques on passive and interactive authentication methods using a more balanced
collected dataset and second proposes a fusion scheme that combines both texture
analysis with interaction in order to enhance the accuracy of spoofing detection.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Automated authentication received a massive attention in that past two decades,
the automatic process of identifying a user to grant access to own private data
is becoming a crucial feature in modern days systems, varying from governments,
airports, banking systems to personal devices. Though Personal Identification Numbers
(PINs) and paired authentication (username and password) are nowadays’ most
common user verification processes, they are easily hacked, predicted by the attacker
or even forgotten, in addition to the most important drawback, the incapability of
the system to recognize the user. Therefore, modern applications are now more
directed towards employing user’s biometric traits for more robust recognition.
Biometric identification is described as identifying an individual based on his or her
distinguishing physiological and/or behavioral characteristics (biometric identifiers)[18].
It connects an individual with predefined identities based on who one is or what one
does. Since some characteristics are distinctive to each person, biometric identification
is considered more reliable and robust to attacks than other identification techniques.
Commonly, several applications -especially the highly critical- are using different
types of biometrics such as iris, fingerprint and facial features as identification tools.
However, attack attempts are rapidly evolving to overcome these powerful measures.
Attackers are now able to clone a user’s finger print to get the access, iris detectors
are highly expensive and not accessible to most of the organizations and to the
majority of public users. Therefore, facial biometrics detection using common 2D
1

cameras is the most suitable authentication technique due to several reasons. First,
it requires simple hardware for acquisition therefore it is better in terms of cost and
usability. And, second, it does not consume high computation effort comparing to
more complex approaches such as 3D image analysis. Consequently, this research
focuses only on the 2D face identification over other biometric verification methods.

1.1

Problem Definition

2D face biometrics is defined as identifying individuals based on their 2D face information[26].
Though its different advantages in user validation, face biometrics are more vulnerable
with the rapid progression of the face spoofing attacks. Typically, faces are not
considered a secret feature as being publicly available and now becoming more
accessible on different social networks. Moreover, attackers could use modern cameras
in order to, not only get pictures of the user, but also could record a video without
prior consent for spoofing actions.
Authors defined a spoofing attack as the action when a person tries to masquerade
as someone else by falsifying data and thereby gaining illegitimate access[26]. Face
spoofing attacks occur in different ways. For example a print attack is when the
attacker uses authorized user’s face feature by showing a still image of the user on
his/her smart device or using a printed copy and displaying it to the camera. While
replay attack is when the attacker replays the authorization process video from a
smart device (phone or tablet) facing the camera, the higher the resolution of the
attacker printer or display device, the easier the attack becomes and the chances
of gaining access become most likely to occur. Another spoofing way is the 3-D
photo-realistic mask with the facial features of a verified user1 . They concluded
that without robust anti-spoofing mechanism, the authentication system is highly
vulnerable.

The need to develop a powerful anti-spoofing system is becoming

more important each day. Currently, several implementations employed passive
1

In addition to photo-realistic masks, plastic surgeries can be performed. However these attacks
are too expensive and mostly unfeasible [21] so they are simply neglected in our assumptions

2

authentication session where the user poses still in front of the camera for a short
period of time (approximately 10 seconds) and then get the system response with
either acceptance or rejection, based on the recognition system results. However
these passive sessions are still more vulnerable to several attacks, most importantly
the replay attacks, due to the vast evolution of smart devices screen resolutions.
Many other cases reported that mobile face unlock feature is extremely vulnerable
to attacks

2

Several users have reported that the simple face unlock android feature

is too vulnerable for attacks, simple experiments were held in which a user poses
a still image from another device to the phone that instantly unlocks the phone.
Not only Face Unlock has a high acceptance rate of allowing unauthorized users to
access others personal data, it also suffers from a high rejection rate of forbidding
authorized users due to different uncontrolled variations, especially under various
lighting conditions.Therefore, it is becoming a necessity to build a powerful system
robust to different attack types by adding the human interaction factor in addition
to typical spoofing countermeasures.

1.2

Motivation and Objectives

Typical 2-D face anti-spoofing process for passive authentication mainly depends on
3 main criteria: motion detection, texture analysis and liveness detection. However,
none of those criteria have showed an outstanding and sufficient performance of
differentiating between attack or genuine authentication attempts when implemented
individually. Some researchers have reached the conclusion that even though motion
is an important visual cue, vitality and nonrigid motion detectors are powerless
under video-replay attacks if interaction is not employed [21].
The main goal in this research is to create an interactive system that combines
texture analysis to challenge response interaction to ensure only the access of legitimate
users. By achieving this goal, this project could be later embedded in smart devices
for applications of high criticality such as banking and confidential data storage.
2

www.neowin.net/news/galaxy-nexus-android-40-face-unlock-broken-by-picture

3

Since most of existing solutions are considered as insufficient in most of real-life
situations and limited to operate under controlled conditions, the main intention is
to develop a reliable anti-spoofing verification system that is proved to accurately
operate apart from different environment variations such as illumination conditions
and camera resolutions and test its efficiency over a balanced collected dataset.

1.3

Thesis Organization

The thesis document is organized as follow, Chapter 2 presents different anti-spoofing
approaches starting first by the methods applied on non-interactive authentication
such as motion analysis, texture analysis and liveness detection, then describes
different presented systems that combines more than one method in order to increase
spoofing detection accuracy, afterwards an overview about challenge-response approaches
presented in the literature and finally discusses the two most important competitions
implementing different spoofing detection approaches. Later, Chapter 4 presents
the proposed method that integrates texture analysis with challenge response and
describes different score fusion classification approaches: weighted sum, artificial
neural networks and support vector machine and compares between their performance
to achieve highest possible spoofing detection accuracy. Metrics used to evaluate the
performance of proposed solution is then presented in addition to the used datasets,
Idiap’s and the collected dataset. Chapter 5 then discusses and analyzes different
experiments performed, presents and evaluates achieved results. Finally, Chapter
6 summarizes and concludes this research and proposes some guidelines for future
work.

4

Chapter 2
LITERATURE SURVEY
The existing state-of-the-art face countermeasures can be organized into three main
categories [5]: motion-based, texture-based and liveness-based[7]. Motion-based methods
mainly investigate the unnatural movements of the scene in case of spoofing attacks,
while the texture-based countermeasures explore the image quality changes and look
for texture artifacts or image quality deterioration that could appear in case of
malicious activities. Finally liveness-based techniques aim to detect any sign of
liveness as clue that the user is actually a real person. This research is mainly
concerned with 2-D face anti-spoofing techniques assuming that no other hardware
such as heat sensors or 3-D camera is added, therefore, the literature survey will
only focus on the most common 2-D face anti-spoofing approaches.
This chapter first covers the fundamental concepts and methodologies used in each
countermeasures category then discusses some previously presented systems in the
literature that combine more than one countermeasure technique in attempts to
increase the accuracy, called multimodals and finally presents a general overview
about the two main spoofing countermeasures competitions that demonstrate the
actual implementations and results of existing solutions.

5

2.1

Motion Analysis

Motion analysis countermeasures are developed based on the fact that real faces
exhibit different motions other than the spoof attacks [11]. Real faces will have
a different motion pattern compared to their backgrounds unlike the attack faces
who presented identical motion sequence as their surrounding atmosphere. The main
scope in this area is to detect and analyze the motion pattern of the user and compare
it to the surrounding environment in order to know whether the person using the
system is a real user or a captured scene replayed to the authentication system.
Generally, the most common main motion detection and analysis approaches used in
facial anti-spoofing applications are Optical Flow [16] and Background Subtraction.

2.1.1

Optical Flow

Different methods used Optical flow field for motion detection. Kollreider et al.[19]
introduced a motion-based spoofing countermeasure that uses optical flow field to
estimate the correlation between different regions of the face used for spoofed still
images detection. This idea was supported by [3] who assumed that the movements
of different parts of the face apply different motion patterns when it is a 3-D object
(real image) while exhibit same motion patterns with a 2-D or planar object (spoofed
image). This conclusion was achieved by creating a system that detects the optical
flow field generated by a planar object , analyzes and compares it to the optical
flow field generated by a 3-D object in order to eventually decide whether the
captured image is of a real face or represents a spoofed image. They based their
assumption on the fact that a human face is an irregular 3-D object , meaning
that the head motions and facial expressions will generate an irregular optical flow
filed. Authors summarized the main unintentional face movements that are easily
detected with optical flow field into four: translation, rotation, moving backward
and forward actions and swing. They concluded that in the first three movement,
the generated optical flow from both 2-D and 3-D objects are actually similar and

6

difficult to distinct while it shows more differences in swing detection, leading to
that the main concern should be more directed towards facial swing actions such
as shaking, raising/lowering head in order to achieve better differentiation. Figure
2.1. shows the four different types of optical flow field while Figure 2.2 highlights
the differences of optical flow fields of movements of smooth printed images, curled
and rough printed images and real faces, respectively.

Figure 2.1: Optical flow fields generated by four basic types of relative motions.(a)
Translation (b) Rotation (c) Moving forward or backward (d) Swing [3]

Figure 2.2: Examples of optical flow field [3]

Being highly sensitive to illumination variations[3], it is proved that Optical
Flow Field should not be used individually for solving an anti-spoofing problem.
On the other hand, its impact is considered a major asset when integrated with
other anti-spoofing measures. Therefore, using optical flow field could be integrated
in our proposed solution for face pose estimation.

7

2.1.2

Background Subtraction

The other motion detection approach is the Background Subtraction, a widely used
technique for generating a foreground mask that contains the pixels that belong to
moving object in the scene [38]. The object is separated from the background for
multiple purposes such as object tracking, object action recognition, among others
but our focus will be limited to applications related to our research such as detecting
the region of interest (ROI) which is the client and extract motion pattern for both
user and background to compare in order to investigate the user’s nature or for
tracking purposes. Figure 2.3 shows an example of a general background subtraction
algorithm.

Figure 2.3: Generic background subtraction algorithm [38]
Background subtraction process is summarized in four major steps as observed in
Figure 2.4: preprocessing, background modeling, foreground detection, and data
validation [6].Preprocessing task is to process the raw input video into a format
that can be processed in the upcoming steps, the next step is the background
modeling where the processed video frame is used to calculate and update the
background model, then the foreground detection in which the pixels that represent
the foreground object are identified and finally data validation examines the selected

8

mask, eliminates pixels that do not belong to moving objects and consequently the
final foreground mask is then produced. [2] focused on the high similarity between

Figure 2.4: Generic background subtraction algorithm [6]
background and face movements, they managed to resolve the issue of print attack
by observing the high correlation between the movement intensities between the face
and the scene background.
One of the existing background subtraction methods is the Robust Background
Subtraction (RBS) which integrates both texture and intensity differences in order
to determine change detection in the frame sequence. This method is proved its
robustness to different background variations in addition to scoring high accuracy
levels in cases of the camouflage of the foreground objects, yet it was limited to
stationary backgrounds [24]. Another motion analysis technique is the Mixture of
Gaussians (MoG) that used multiple color clusters for background modeling [34] [23],
meaning that the colors from a background’s pixel are described y multiple Gaussian
distributions. This method adapted properly with different scene variations that
could negatively affect the segmentation process such as lighting changes, repetitive
motions of some elements in the scene, and slow-moving objects[34], which is presented
as a favorable method in case of outdoors scene capturing. Li el al [23] proposed
a video motion detection technique for foreground objects with both moving and
stationary backgrounds.The main challenge was to separate the foreground object
from a constantly changing background such as moving trees or under different
illumination conditions. This issue was resolved by computing the movement score
Sm from the average movement of pixels across the image as shown in the following

9

equation:
avgm =

nmov
ntot

(2.1)

where nmov is the number of moving pixels extracted from the motion detector and
ntot is the total number of pixels in the image. Sm is calculated using a normalization
function [37]. Figure 2.5. shows the foreground segmentation while comparing it
to other motion segmentation approaches such as RBS and MoG with the ground
truth. Resulting images concluded that the background subtraction method was
more accurate as it achieved results with high similarity to the ground truth.

(a) The test on a video containing moving
curtains. (a) a frame from the video,
(b) the maintained background reference
image, (c) the result of RBS, (d) the
result of the MoG, (e) the result of the
foreground object detection method, (f)
the “ground truth”.

(b) The test on a video containing
wavering tree branches in strong winds.
(a) a frame from the video, (b) the
maintained background reference image,
(c) the result of RBS, (d) the result of
the MoG, (e) the result of the foreground
object detection method, (f) the “ground
truth”

Figure 2.5: Examples of foreground segmentation experiments [23]

Though motion analysis has proved major success covering the print attacks in which
the attacker uses a still image (either printed or from a device) of the real user,
it still scores unsatisfactory results when solely employed, particularly in cases of
replay attacks where the impostor video replay expresses the same non rigid motion
10

patterns as a real user, which could eventually mislead the system to wrongfully
accept the attack as a genuine attempt.

2.2

Texture Analysis

The texture-based methods mainly study the texture effects and the image quality
deterioration that appear in cases of attacks.[7]. In this category, methods are
applied based on the belief that during the reproduction process from real face to
fake ones, high frequency information will be lost [41]. The first attempt towards
anti-spoofing using texture analysis was made in [22] where the authors argue that
the frequency distributions on the image of a live person differ from an attack.
Authors used Fourier transform to extract high frequency information, and comparing
to a certain threshold, a face image could be classified as fake if its high frequency
energy percentage is lower than the threshold. Figure 2.6. shows the differences in
frequency domain between real and fake images.

(a) Genuine
Face

(b) Fake Face

(c)
2D
Fourier
Spectra of (a)

(d)
2D
Fourier
Spectra of (b)

Figure 2.6: Difference between live face and fake face in the frequency domain [22]

Tan et al. [35] formed their algorithm based on the idea that an impostor image
will be captured twice and therefore it will suffer from major distortion and will
have relatively lower image quality, so they used Difference of Gaussian (DoG) and
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Logarithmic Total Variation (LTV) algorithms to increase the separability of the
sample space and consequently, simplifying the classification process.
Several attempts [28] for facial anti-spoofing based on texture analysis have considered
Gabor Wavelet [27] and Histogram of Gradients (HoG) [10]. Chingovska et al.
aimed at learning the fine differences between the images of real face and those of
face prints, and then designing a feature space which emphasizes those differences
[8]. Määttä et al. proposed the Micro-Texture Analysis (MTA)[26] as a powerful
method that integrates LBP operator with SVM. This method achieved outstanding
results , even better than Gabor wavelet and HoG, when implemented upon several
datasets, most importantly, the Idiap [8] dataset. This solution is a powerful spoofing
detection implementation that is considered to be the base in our research due to its
impressive performance in both Print and Replay attacks, discussed in section2.7.
Therefore, a more profound survey is needed to properly investigate the Local Binary
Pattern.

2.2.1

Local Binary Pattern (LBP)

Inspired by the fact that some binary patterns occur more commonly in texture
images than others[26], Ojala et al. [29] have recognized “uniform” patterns that
represent and preserve the fundamental properties of local image texture and in
the same time invariant to gray-scale and rotation changes. Thanks to their circular
presentation , Local Binary Patterns correlate to image micro-features such as edges,
corners and spots while being robust to different luminance changes, making it one
simple yet powerful feature detector. LBP operator LBPP,R is achieved by the
symmetrical circular neighbor set P forming a circle a radius R with a center of
each pixel in the image. The LBPP,R is computed by the following simple equation:

LBPP,R =

PX
−1

s(gp − gc )2p

(2.2)

p=0

Where the operator s(x) is the signed differences between gray value intensities of
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each neighboring pixel gp and the center gc each neighboring cell and the center
computed as :

s(x) =






1

x≥0





0

x <0

(2.3)

The original LBP operator labels image pixels by thresholding the 3 x 3 neighborhood
of each pixel with the center value which creates a binary operator.Fig 2.7 shows
how an image pixel binary operator is calculated.
Following equation (2.2), the parameter P handles the angular transformation

Figure 2.7: Basic LBP8,1 Operator Example [26]
while the radius R determines the spatial resolution of which make the scored LBP
operator robust to different types of variations such as translation, rotation and
illumination effects.
Authors addressed the spoofing issue in terms of detecting the micro-texture features
[26] of the image using the algorithm that first starts with converting the detected
face image into gray-scale then apply 3 LBP operators of different parameters
LBP16,2 , LBP8,1 and LBP8,2 on the selected face area, then a histogram is created for
each calculated operator, afterwards a global histogram is formed by concatenating
all the 3 histograms together, finally an SVM with radial basis function kernel
determines whether the input histogram represents a genuine or a spoofed image.
Differences between LBP histograms of genuine and fake video frames are illustrated
in Figure2.8, while Figure 2.9. shows the overview of the spoofing detection using
micro-texture analysis solution which achieved impressive results of nearly perfect
classification (∼ 98%) with a false acceptance rate = 0.6% and a false rejection rate
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= 4.4%.

Figure 2.8: Difference between LBP Histograms of Genuine, 1st , and Fake, 2nd row
Video Frames

Figure 2.9: Micro-Texture Analysis Overview [26]

Another successful micro-texture analysis implementation was done by chingovska
et al. [8] when they divided their experiment into two main options, as shown
in Fig.2.10, where option 1 takes the complete image and retrieve a single LBP
histogram for all the image then make it a subject to the classifier who decides
whether the image is genuine or attack. While the second approach is to divide the
14

image into several blocks, for each a histogram is calculated then concatenated into
a single global histogram which takes a part in the classifier to distinguish the real
from attack attempts. The classification was based on a chi-square (χ2 ) histogram
comparison, where a comparison between histograms of spoof and real videos was
held to get a suitable reference histogram

Figure 2.10: Block diagram of the proposed LBP based anti-spoofing algorithm[8]
They extended their experiments to include more complex classifiers such as Support
Vector Machine (SVM) and Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA). Results showed
that using uniform LBP3,3 with SVM presented better performance than the combination
of uniform LBP3,3 + LDA, as seen in table 2.1.

Table 2.1: HTER (%) of Classification with Different Classifiers [8]
LBP3×3 + χ2
dev
test
31.24
34.01

2.3

LBP3×3 + LDA
dev
test
19.60
17.17

LBP3×3 + SVM
dev
test
14.84
15.16

Liveness Detection

Aiming at detecting the vital facial signs, liveness detection is defined as detecting
physiological signs of life, such as eye blinking, facial expression changes and mouth
movements[21] in addition to different facial poses. Generally, liveness detection for
face recognition focuses mainly on the facial expression change or movement [3]. It is
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important to mention the difference between liveness detection and motion analysis
in the sense that the former focuses only on detecting signs of life in order to verify
whether the client is a real person or not, while the later directs its attention towards
the motion patterns between the client and the surrounding environment. Pan et
al. concluded that blinking can be detected by a generic camera as a human blinks
occur every 2-4 seconds and lasts for a time interval 250 milliseconds, an interval
that can be easily detected by a generic camera [31]. This approach is introduced
for prevention of photograph-spoofing yet it does not work for video spoofing. Many
applications used Optical flow field to detect the liveness clues in the scene [3], in
[20], Kollerider et al. used optical flow of lines to measure the lip movement.
Another interesting liveness detection approach was the Eulerian Video Magnification
[39], a method that takes an input video sequence, Fig.2.11(a), applies spatial
decomposition, then a temporal filtering to the frames, producing a output signal
that is later amplified to reveal hidden information unrecognized by the bare eye
as seen in Fig.2.11(b). Though this method has proved great performance in other
applications, it did not score satisfactory results in spoofing detection.

(a) input

(b) magnified

Figure 2.11: Euler Magnification for visualizing human pulse [39]

16

2.4
2.4.1

Multi-Modal and Multi-Algorithm Systems
Multi-Modal Systems

Each of the previously mentioned countermeasures when employed alone, is regarded
as unimodal. Though seemingly recognized as powerful and independently robust to
attacks, the probability of vulnerabilities in unimodals are actually high. Therefore,
research turns its attention to increase the complexity of breaking the system by
combining more than one countermeasure technique in order to limit the number
of false acceptance occurrences, ie. granting an attacker the access to unauthorized
data.
While some claim that a multi-modal system could be less secure than other unimodal
systems based on the assumption that more measures to cover leads to more vulnerability
points, which eventually providing the impostor with more weak points to tackle[33].
This assumption is valid when too many measures are considered. Currently, researchers
are now more interested in combining more than one measure to form a robust
anti-spoofing system, yet the main challenge remains in selecting the most suitable
methods that reach the highest level of accuracy with the least chances of vulnerabilities.
Another challenge remained in knowing how to make the decision after combining
results from the different system modules.
There are several multimodals previously mentioned in the literature. Some of
them combined several biometrics into their system. For example, Rodrigues et
al. [33] combined fingerprint with face spoofing detection at a score level , their
results was not satisfactory as the score level approach has significantly increased
the false acceptance rates. Biggio et al. [4] analyzed the robustness of a multi-modal
biometric verification system by combining fingerprint and face biometrics identification,
illustrated in figure2.12, under more realistic spoofing attacks situation. Using that
bi-modal system, they investigated the validity of the results obtained under the
worst-case attack assumptions, where the impostor is capable of perfectly replicate
the biometric traits of a genuine user.
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Figure 2.12: Example of a bi-modal system, combining facial and fingerprint
analysis[4]
Another proposed multimodal that fused fingerprint, face and speech together
[17]. Though apparently it achieved promising results, it encountered several issues,
first, it suffers from very high rejection rates, second, the increase cost of deploying
such system is higher due to the usage of multiple sensors and finally, it is not
usually accepted by the public to use complex and slow actions for authentication.
Therefore, it is less encouraging to use multimodals that combine several biometric
traits.

2.4.2

Multi-Algorithm Systems

Nevertheless, the trend of using multi-algorithmic systems that combine several
algorithms to analyze a single biometric trait is more promising than the multi-biometric.
Different proposed solutions were introduced to combine multiple 2D face spoofing
countermeasures in order to reach a better verification performance. In [30] Pan et
al. continued their work in [31] by combining the liveness detection technique by
using eye-blink detector with texture analysis by including scene context matching,
as seen in Figure2.13, this is achieved by comparing the difference of regions of
interests in the reference scene image and the input video using an LBP descriptors.

In [40], authors combined motion with texture analysis to increase the accuracy of
spoofing detection. They explored the non-rigid motions exerted by the client and
the consistency of the motion patterns between the face and the background. In
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Figure 2.13:
analysis [30]

Anti-Spoofing system combining liveness detection with texture

analyzing the texture quality of the captured frames, they examined the banding
effects, the artifacts that affect the quality of the image in case of displaying a
captured image or a recorded video to the camera. Another implementation that
combined motion correlation analysis with face texture analysis was introduced in
[21]. Figure 2.14 outlines the algorithm. First, authors measured the correlation
between the user’s head movement and the background algorithm by [2]. Then a
micro-texture analysis [26] description is performed in order to decide if the resulting
LBP histogram corresponds to the properties of genuine face or not. Finally, the
two results are then fused at a score level using Linear Logistic Regression (LLR).

Figure 2.14: Block diagram of the multi-algorithm anti-spoofing solution.[21]
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2.5

Fusion Methods

The main issue to consider while using combining multiple spoofing detection techniques
is actually the question of how to combine the partial scores of each module in the
system in order to finally make the most accurate decision about whether the client
is real or not. There are numerous classification of fusions score levels. Fusion levels
are categorized as follow[1]: sensor, feature, rank, and decision levels. Where sensor
level , sometimes referred to as score level, consists of the combination of raw outputs
produced by each submodule in the system without any type of preprocessing or
feature extraction. While in feature level, the acquired data are processed to extract
feature descriptors. Rank level fusion method entails that the classifier’s output
are ranked with a decreasing confidence level[36] and finally, in the decision level,
each classifier selects own representation scheme and produces a confidence value as
output [32]. Selecting which fusion scheme to be employed depends on the nature
of the multimodal/multi-algorithmic application itself. It mainly relies on how the
acquired data should be processed in order to achieve the highest performance level.

2.6

Challenge-Response Approach

Almost all of the previously mentioned anti-spoofing methodologies were applied on
the non-intrusive type of authentication, i.e. no user contribution or collaboration
is required. The systems that detected the liveness of the user has approached the
issue in terms of the basic movements that a still user performs. In this section, we
are presenting the intrusive anti-spoofing methodologies, the systems that challenge
the client with a certain set of instructions and then compares the response to
validate whether the person is real or an attacker. This approach is considered an
important baseline to our proposal implementation for its capability in identifying
the replay-attacks. Several face recognition systems have worked on creating a
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robust verification system using the challenge-response approach. One of the first
attempts that applied challenge response. Researchers presented BioID, Fig.2.15, a
multimodal biometric system [14]. The proposed system specified randomized set
of instructions to the user to change head pose, then a pose estimation algorithm
compares and matches the responsive actions of the user to the requested actions
(challenge). Another research tried to optimize liveness detection by building an

(a) Using BioID

(b) head poses directions

Figure 2.15: BioID, Face Recognition System [14]
interactive real-time face detection system that reads user’s lips after playing audio
tracks of words or numbers[20]. If lips reading process is accepted, then the user
stands still for recognition. That system proved failure for several reasons, first
it is inefficient for users with hearing and/or speaking disability and second, it
enabled the attacker to perform the actions then display a still image of the real
user to the camera during recognition. Other attempts targeted face detection
and recognition in 3D which required special 3D projection cameras [12] and [15],
however, we are only interested in systems that use common 2D cameras and do not
require additional hardware.
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2.7

2-D Facial Spoofing Attacks Countermeasures
Competitions

Took place in ’11 and ’13, the two competitions were held among the proceedings of
the International (Joint) Conference on Biomterics as a practical implementation of
spoofing countermeasures, the main goal of the competition is to present, compare
and evaluate different anti-spoofing algorithms.

In this section, we are briefly

presenting the scope of interest of each competition, the participating teams, the
implemented solutions and the performance results.

2.7.1

The 1st Competition

Started in 2011 [5], six teams from different international universities and research
institutes participated in this competition. The main scope in the first competition
was to compare the performance of different state-of-the-art algorithms on the same
database using a unique evaluation method, while the challenge was deriving reliable
anti-spoofing techniques robust to print attacks 1 , the cases in which the attacker will
display a printed image of the verified user to the camera. Contestants were given
a dataset consisting of 200 videos of real accesses and 200 videos of attack attempts
of 50 different identities with different backgrounds and under different lighting
conditions.It is to mention, in both competitions, there was two different ways to
support the displayed attack media, fixed-support, that is when the spoofed image
or video are supported on the wall and hand-support, in which the attacker holds
the attack media with hands. Table 2.2 shows the detailed distribution of videos in
the Print-Attack dataset.
Table 2.2: Print-Attack Dataset
Type
Real
Print-Attack
1

Train
60
60

https://www.idiap.ch/dataset/printattack
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Devel Test
60
80
60
80

The AMILAB team combined all countermeasure technique in order to reach the
highest level of accuracy possible. First, they targeted multiple types of visual
features such as textures and edges to detect the differences between real and spoof
sessions. Then they used Support Vector Machine (SVM) to computer a frame level
confidence score. They addressed the motion analysis method by calculating the
average movement as well as detecting eye blinks as additional sign of life. Finally
they combined all of the produced results at score level as a weighted sum:

s∗ =





α.simage_analysis

+ (1 − α).sblinks ,




α1 .simage_analysis

+ α2 .sblinks + α3 .smotion

if smotion is high.

(2.4)

if smotion is low,

They concluded that they add the motion value into the score-level fusion system
only in the case of low average detected motion. Next participant in the competition
was the CASIA team that based their implementation on the facts that a real
video has less noise than a spoofed one, real videos express more non-rigid motion
patterns unlike attacks that whether show global motion or no motion at all and
the face motion in real attempts should be independent from the background.
IDIAP and UOULU, are the only teams that only focused on texture analysis
without integrating it with other countermeasure techniques. Both used Local
Binary Pattern (LBP) in their implementation, IDIAP processed the video with an
LBP histogram then used χ2 method to compare between the produced histogram
and a preprocessed reference histogram. On the other hand, UOULU have adopted
the Micro-Texture Analysis (MTA) that combines an LBP feature histogram with
SVM. as seen in table 2.3, those two teams are the only ones who achieve zero percent
error rates in both the development and the test subsets. SINAI team focused only
on the motion analysis by detecting facial key features such as eyes, nose and mouth
in addition to the face contour in order to compare over the frames the motion and
thus producing motion information needed to detect an attack. Finally UNICAMP
team who, like the AMILAB team, has tackled the three spoofing countermeasures
methodologies to increase the level of confidence in achieving results. They explored
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both spatial and temporal information in order to learn the differences between
genuine and attack videos, this was done by locating discriminative regions within
the face.

Table 2.3: Usage of Spoofing Countermeasures Categories and Performance Results,
2011
Categories
Teams
AMILAB
CASIA
IDIAP
SINAI
UNICAMP
UOULU

Motion Texture
X
X
.
X
X
.

X
X
X
.
X
X

Performance
Devel
Test
Liveness
FAR FRR FAR FRR HTER
X
0.00 0.00 0.00 1.25
0.63
.
1.67 1.67 0.00 0.00
0.00
.
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00
.
1.67 1.67 0.00 21.25 10.63
X
1.67 1.67 1.25 0.00
0.63
.
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00

There are several observations to conclude after this competition. First, the attack
videos in this database consist of texture patterns that are easy to detect, that
conclusion was achieved after the exceptional results of both UOULU and IDIAP
teams. Second, teams who employed all the 3 categories together have scored nearly
perfect results, which means that combining all the 3 experts together does not
actually guarantee a perfect performance.

2.7.2

The 2nd Competition

Following the first competition on counter measures to 2D spoofing attacks, the
second competition was organized in 2013[7]. This time the number of participating
teams has increased to eight contesting teams from a wider variety of universities
and research institutes. The scope of this event was to challenge researchers to
create countermeasures effectively detecting a variety of attacks, under different
lighting conditions and with variations in the resolution of the display devices. In
the 2013 competition, participants were offered a more extended dataset

2

(∼ 1300

videos) that contains more real videos and a wider variety of spoof attacks under
2

https://www.idiap.ch/dataset/replayattack
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2 different lighting conditions and with several spoofing methods such as using a
printed image, a still image displayed from low-resolution devices (cellular phones)
and images displayed from a high-resolution devices (tablets). In addition to replay
attacks where a recorded video of a real user is replayed to the camera. Table 2.4
outlines the number of videos in each subset in the Replay-Attack dataset given to
contestants in 2013 competition.
In this competition, no team has combined the three countermeasures methodologies
Table 2.4: Replay-Attack Dataset
Type
Real
Replay-Attack

Train
60
300

Devel Test
60
80
300
400

into a single implementation, each team had rather focused on developing a spoofing
detection system that scores the highest accuracy with the possible least amount of
complexity. CASIA had also joined this competition only this time, participants
directed their attention to combine motion with texture analysis.

For motion

analysis, they based their solution on the assumption that the real videos express
non-rigid motions, contrary to fake videos that show either global motion or no
motion. They used optical flow to identify the global and local motion patterns.
Concerning texture-analysis, the team applied multi-scale Local Binary Patterns
(LBP) in order to analyze the quality degradation of the attack samples. The
extracted motion and texture features are concatenated into the final feature vector
that is later fed to an SVM. The second team IGD used the Eulerian magnification
to detect subtle changes in the faces of the user in the videos that are characteristic
for real accesses and cannot be shown by a replayed video. The MaskDown group
also combined motion with texture analysis. In the motion analysis they examined
the high correlation between the movements in the background and in the face region
in the case of spoofing attacks while investigated the video texture by extracting two
types of features: uniform local binary pattern (LBP) and Gray-Level Co-occurrence
Matrix (GLCM). All the three features vectors are then concatenated and then fed
to an SVM. Same countermeasure pair was selected by the LNMIIT team that
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combined on a feature level fusion scheme the LBP with the Gaussian Mixture
Model (GMM) in addition to a third type of features that combines motion and
texture analysis and consists of 2D FFT on the GMM modeled background. All
of the three feature vectors are fed to a Hidden-Markov SVM SV M hmm . Focusing
only on texture analysis, Muvis adopted a texture-based approach by extracting
two types of texture features: LBP and Gabor for the whole scene not just image
area. After that, the feature vector is fed into a Partial Least Square Regression
classifier. Aiming to discover the detailed characteristics in the visual structure of
the input samples, PRA Lab team members focused only on static image analysis
for spoofing detection. They explored a variety of features in the images such as
color, edges and others, then they trained several SVM’s for each feature separately.
The final spoofing score is produced after applying a two-stage score combination
procedure: first, is the fusion of all scores produced from features SVM’s for each
frame, and in the second stage, the scores of the frames are combined to calculate a
final score of the video. The team used Dynamic Score Combination as a score-level
fusion rule. Participants from the ATVS team proposed a solution based on the
assumption that recaptured images have different characteristics and quality traits
other than the real image. They measured the level of distortion in the input
images using the parameterization of 25 Image Quality Measures (IQM). Unicamp
was the second team to join both competitions after CASIA. Unlike their solution
in the first competition that combined all the three spoofing detection approaches,
in the second competition they only based their spoofing classification on detecting
the textural properties in the samples. To extract noises from the input videos,
they presented a feature characterization algorithm that uses 2D discrete Fourier
Transform to perform a spectral analysis of noise patterns. Table 2.5. summarizes
each contesting team anti-spoofing categories selection and performance results.

We observed several points in the achieved results in this competition. First, the
most popular spoofing detection approach was the texture analysis. No solution had
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Table 2.5: Usage of Spoofing Countermeasures Categories and Performance Results,
2013
Categories
Teams
CASIA
IGD
MaskDown
LNMIIT
MUVIS
PRA Lab
ATVS
Unicamp

Texture
X
.
X
X
X
X
X
X

Performance
Devel
Test
Motion Liveness
FAR FRR HTER FAR FRR HTER
X
.
0.00 0.00
0.00
0.00 0.00
0.00
.
X
5.00 8.33
6.67
17.00 1.25
9.13
X
.
1.00 0.00
0.50
0.00 5.00
2.50
X
.
0.00 0.00
0.00
0.00 0.00
0.00
.
.
0.00 0.00
0.00
0.00 2.50
1.25
.
.
0.00 0.00
0.00
0.00 2.50
1.25
.
.
1.67 0.00
0.83
2.75 21.25 12.00
.
.
13.00 6.67
9.83
12.50 18.75 15.62

solely used the motion analysis, it was always paired with texture-based approaches.
IGD was the only team to use liveness detection as the only approach. For combining
several approaches together, fusion rules was performed either at a score-level or at a
feature-level, regardless of the used features. Three teams had employed feature-level
fusion, while CASIA and LNMIIT have combined two different approaches in their
implementation, MUVIS used the same fusion method within a single approach.
On the other hand, another three teams used the score-level fusion, PRA Lab has
used a specific type of the fusion method to combine several scores from different
classifiers at a single spoofing detection method unlike the MaskDown algorithm that
combined different methods. The two winning teams CASIA and LNMIIT who both
chose Motion and texture analysis as the main spoofing countermeasures and scored
impressive results of 0% Half Total Error Rate (HTER). This conclusion is very
important as we will combine both texture and motion analysis in our proposed
solution within an interactive scenario.
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Chapter 3
REVIEW OF
STATE-OF-THE-ART
CLASSIFIERS
In order to evaluate and compare spoofing attempts, the system needs to employ
a classifier that differentiate between real users and impersonators. In literature
there exist several types of classifiers that take for inputs the scores achieved by
the two components of the proposed solution and should be able to produce an
accurate decision about the nature of the user. In this chapter we are presenting a
brief review of two traditional modern classifiers that are later used in our proposed
method, Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) and Support Vector Machine (SVM).

3.1

Artificial Neural Networks

Inspired by the biological nature of human brains, an artificial neural network is
a computational model that mimics the performance of human brain pattern. A
neuron, smallest component in a neural network, receives some inputs, multiplies
them with weights following a certain activation function and produces a result as
an output of the network.
Assigned weights represent the value or importance of inputs to the network and
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they are adjustable in order to reduce the difference between the expected output
and the actual output achieved by the neural network. The activation function
is the representation of the neurons’ decision making where the most famous and
reliable type is the sigmoid function thanks to its simple derivatives calculations
that help calculating the weights adjustments during training process. The most
feasible artificial neural network approach to our classification purposes is a back
propagation multi-layer perceptron.
The backpropagation algorithm consists of two main phases, propagation and weight
update. The first step in the propagation is forward-propagation, which is adding
inputs to the first (or input) layer of the network, training weights and setting
activation functions. Then backpropagation takes place starting by the output layer
activation functions back to all hidden neurons in the network in order to check
for error and validate the output compared to the expected output. In the weight
update phase is when the weights are calculated and updated based on the calculated
error. The stopping criterion of the backpropagation training process is set based
on a certain value, either a minimumn error or a specific number of iterations.

3.2

Support Vector Machine

Introduced by Cortes and Vapnik [9], SVM is machine learning classification method.
It is summarized as follow: inputs, represented by input vectors are non-linearly
mapped to a high dimension feature space where a decision surface, a quadratic
formula, is constructed to classify between those input features while ensuring high
generalization ability of the learning machine. It is considered as a robust and
powerful method in data analysis and pattern recognition. Following is a brief
summary of the training process of a linear SVM. A typical representation of a
support vector machine is seen in Figure3.1.
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Figure 3.1: Example of a separable problem in a 2 dimensional space, where the
gray squares represent the support vector for an optimal classification[9]

The theory of a linearly separable support vector machine starts by identifying
L training points where each input xi has D attributes and labeled to be one of
two classes yi = −1 or + 1. Therefore the training data will be presented in the
following form:

{xi , yi }

i = 1...Lyi ∈ {−1, 1}, x ∈ RD

where

(3.1)

For linear separability, a hyperplane of graphs of x1 , x2 , ..., xD for D >2
The hyperplane is described as follows:

w·x+b=0

where w is normal to hyperplane and

b
||w||

(3.2)

represents the perpendicular distance from

the hyperplane to the origin[13] and b is the bias. Support vectors are the points or
features closest to separating plane where the main target of the SVM is to place the
hyperplane as further as possible from the selected points of both classes. Figure
3.2 describes in detail the selection of variables w and b where

xi · w + b ≥ +1

f or yi = 1

(3.3)

f or yi = −1

(3.4)

and
xi · w + b < −1
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Figure 3.2: Detailed Representation of an SVM Illustrating the Hyperplane between
Linear Separable Classes [13]
Combining these equations results:

yi (xi · w + b) − 1 ≥ 0

∀i

(3.5)

The next step is summarized into selecting the support vectors, the points that are
closely placed next to the separating hyperplane. Selecting the planes where these
points lie is presented by:
xi · w + b = +1

f or H1

xi · w + b = −1

f or H2

(3.6)

As seen in Figure3.2, d1 and d2 are the equal distances between the hyperplane
and H1 and H2, known as SVM margin, that is equal to

1
.
||w||

In order to increase

the classification accuracy level, these distances need to be maxmimzed as much
as possible. The maximization process is summarized in the following Quadratic
Problem:

maxα =


PL

i=1



αi −

1 T
α Hα
2

such that

αi ≥ 0 ∀i

and

L
X

αi yi = 0 (3.7)

i=1

Where α represents the vector of weights of the support vectors of the training
set. This problem could be solved using a QP solver and the values of α are then
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achieved. Next step in applying linearly separable SVM is to find w by applying :

w=

L
X

αi yi xi

(3.8)

i=1

After calculating the values in w, b value is achieved through

b=

X
1 X
(ys −
α m y m xm · xs )
Ns s∈S
m∈S

(3.9)

and finally the testing process takes place by testing a point x0 using the equation

y 0 = f (w · x0 + b)

(3.10)

One of the major advantages of the support vector machine is its efficient capability
of performing non-linear in addition to linear classification. In this study, classification
between live and fake users will require such robust classifier in recognizing and
detecting the differences between the texture of video frames of both types of users.
Another usage of SVM would take place by training using the output results of the
two parts of our implementation and classifying based on these two parameters.
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Chapter 4
PROPOSED METHOD
4.1

Proposed System Architecture

Based on several conclusions in the literature that employing interaction is essential
to obtain a powerful anti-spoofing system that is robust to replay attacks in addition
to the outstanding results of applying LBP in texture analysis and spoofing classification,
our proposed method will investigate integrating both approaches together to attain
more optimized and accurate results. Figure4.1 illustrates the architecture of our
approach that is divided into two main parts, texture analysis using local binary
pattern and challenge response interaction, where the number of correctly detected
actions in addition to the score of texture analysis are combined into a single output.

Figure 4.1: Proposed Method Architecture
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4.1.1

Texture Analysis

Starting first with the texture analysis using Local Binary Pattern, this choice was
made based on the outstanding results achieved by the Local Binary Pattern in both
competitions [5] and [7], in addition to its simple implementation. The first part
in our proposed solution focuses on analyzing video frame texture using a simple
Local Binary Pattern that retrieves a binary pattern of each pixel by comparing its
intensity value to the surrounding 8 neighboring pixels with a 1-pixel radius range.
This pattern - as mentioned in section 2.2.1 - provides detailed information about
the texture of the image on a pixel scale that is robustly capable of differentiating
between the texture of genuine and fake recorded video frames. One of the most
feasible techniques to deduce in the latest state-of-the-art solutions to encode the
LBP into a single feature for each video is the enhanced feature histogram. It was
also concluded in the literature that most successful spoofing classification method
is to feed Support Vector Machine with a global histogram of a subset or all video
frames.
The texture analysis proposed solution first starts by reading each video frame and
convert it to gray scale as applying LBP works on comparing the pixel intensities.
Next step is to apply the LBP operator by extracting a binary pattern of each pixel
in the image. Later, these binary values where normalized in a scale 0-255 in order
to produce LBP histogram. Last step in extracting texture properties is to create a
global histogram by accumulating all histograms of the first 200 frames in each of the
dataset videos. Two reasons behind choosing the first 200 video frames, first, this
number of frames is suitable for achieving proper and accurate classification, and
second, it could be applied on both passive and interactive types of authentication
videos, regardless of frame counts.
For spoofing classification, Figure4.2, the starting point was training a linear SVM
with global histograms of all videos in the Idiap’s train dataset [8]. Once the classifier
is trained, same previous steps were applied over each video in the collected dataset,
either motionless or interactive, and finally each global histogram was fed to the
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SVM and achieved response is the first input parameter to the fusion scheme.

Figure 4.2: Texture Analysis Spoofing Classification

4.1.2

Challenge-Response Interaction

The second component in the proposed scheme is the interaction authentication
mode in an attempt to involve the user in the verification process to enhance
spoofing detection accuracy. Our main assumption in this approach was based on
the real-time trait of the system to prevent impostors from spoofing, because if the
user is genuine, required actions will be performed with a relatively small human
error margin unlike fake attempts where the attacker will not be allowed to select
and replay the required action within a limited time frame. Therefore the attacker
will be forced either to replay a video with no actions at all or to pose a device
playing a video with a random sequence of events that is highly likely to mismatch
the required order of actions, which will be eventually rejected by the anti-spoofing
system.
Challenge-response interaction authentication process starts by detecting the frontal
face of the user using OpenCV’s haar cascade classifier where the face center region
is then calculated and detected. For accurate detection, this process is done within
60 frames. After face center point is detected and marked as the good feature to
track or reference point, the user listens to an audio sound that requests a head
motion action from the user to perform, the motion actions are to move the face
in one of the four directions: right, up, left and down, figure 4.3. Afterwards, the
motion angle of the user’s head is calculated by tracking the face center point using
an optical flow lucas-kanade method[25] over a time range of 80 frames per action
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Figure 4.3: Head Motion Actions Examples
to detect and compute user’s angle of motion. The angle is then compared to the
motion angle range and if it matches the range of the required action, Figure 4.4,
this will increment the number of detected actions. Once the response is calculated
the system then asks the user to change pose back to frontal view then the process
is repeated asking the user for 3 more actions in a randomized sequence. It is
important to mention that in order to increase detection accuracy, user is asked to
move face back to frontal view between each requested action so the reference point
is reset and the next motion direction is correctly calculated. After all responses are
computed, the output of that module is the number of correctly matching detected
actions.

Figure 4.4: Regions of Interest for Action Identification
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Lucas-Kanade-Tomasi Optical Flow
Lucas-Kanade is a simple method to estimate the movement of interesting features
in successive images of the scene. Optical flow is a description of motion of image
objects between successive frames caused by the object or camera motion, consisting
of 2D vector field describing the displacement of points between frames. This
method was generated based on two main assumptions that first, pixel intensities
do not change between frames and second, neighboring pixels exhibit similar motion
patterns. Equation (4.1) was developed based on the first assumption

I(x, y, t) = I(x + dx, y + dy, t + dt)

(4.1)

where I is the intensity of a pixel at location x and y at time t, that moved by
a distant (dx,dy) with a time difference (dt) in the second frame. After applying
Taylor approximation of right hand side and remove common term (dt) the equation
is derived into
fx u + fy v + ft = 0
where

(4.2)

∂f
∂f
fy =
∂x
∂y
dx
dy
u=
v=
dt
dt

fx =

Based on the second assumption, that neighboring pixels show similar motion patterns.
for example, the Lucas-Kanade method considers the 3×3 neighboring pixels for
each pixel that approximately follow the same motion pattern, using the following
equation:

(4.3)
Eventually, displacement rates u and v are calculated indicating the displacement
or motion rate exerted by the feature(s) of interest. One of major drawback in
the Lucas-Kanade method is its sensitivity to noise, this is due to the assumption
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that pixel movement between two consecutive frames is extremely small, so if pixel
displacement was relatively faster, correct tracking might be lost.

In order to

overcome the local tracking issue of the Lucas-Kanade algorithm, a more global
method to track the center point of the face was achieved using Opencv’s function
calcOpticalFlowPyrLK that calculates an optical flow of points of interest using the
iterative Lucas-Kanade-Tomasi method with pyramids.
The Tomasi algorithm used in our proposed solution is used with detecting the
good features to track. However instead of enabling the system to automatically
detect and recognize those features, we feed the face center point, needless to say
after its selection from frontal view face detection, Figure4.5, to the feature tracker
implementation that later uses the Lucas-Kanade-Tomasi component for tracking
the change in head pose of the user and after a certain fixed number of frames,
calculate the angle of motion by comparing last saved frontal face center point with
the final point achieved by the tracker.

Figure 4.5: Face Center Point Tracking Sequence using LKT Feature Tracking
Method
The pyramidal structure in the of the optical flow algorithm is used to overcome
the limited scope characteristic of a typical Lucas-Kanade tracker. The iterative
process occurs when large displacement on the features points is expected, where it
starts by scaling down the size of the image and applying Gaussian filters in order
to scale and smoothen the image or frame, which will fit the displacement within
the scope of the LK tracking method.
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4.2

Fusion Methods

In this section, we test, evaluate and compare the achieved scores of three fusion
methods in attempt to reach a precise decision about the most successful scheme
to employ for improved spoofing classification results. Starting first by a simple
weighted sum where the weights were arbitrary chosen, then applying a simple
artificial neural network with 2 hidden layers and finally training and testing a
support vector machine, presented in the following sections.

4.2.1

Weighted Sum

In this proposed design, the first fusion method to use is a simple weighted sum
calculation that combines the results of the texture analysis with the number of
correctly detected responses matching the action requests. The fusion equation can
be presented as follow:

T otal_Score = SV Mresponse × WSV M + N oDetected_Actions × WDetected_Actions (4.4)

A threshold is then set according to the scores weights of both texture analysis and
interaction and finally the final decision about the genuineness of authentication
session is achietved by comparing the video total score with the set threshold.
Although weights are usually arbitrarily selected, the variations rely on the system
security requirements. For example, if it is a highly critical application, then more
weights will be given to the interaction more than the texture analysis.

4.2.2

Artificial Neural Network (ANN)

The second fusion method in this study is applying artificial neural networks for
merging the scores of texture analysis response and the number of detected actions
in order to achieve accurate classification results. In our experiment we applied a
simple ANN that takes for training input a subset of the scores of the texture analysis
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decision and the number of correctly detected actions and the a list of labels of each
input, either 1 for genuine or 0 for spoof attempt and then output results are the
responses for the test subset of scores.

4.2.3

Support Vector Machine (SVM)

Finally, the last fusion method in our proposed solution is the support vector
machine, we start this method by first training a linear SVM with the a percentage of
the achieved dataset scores, the texture analysis results and the number of correctly
detected actions in addition to a label list, same as in the artificial neural network
approach. Output results are the responses ranging from 0 to 1

4.3
4.3.1

Evaluation Metrics
Spoofing Detection Accuracy

The evaluation method is based on calculating the Half Total Error Rate (HTER)
which is the mean between False Acceptance Rate (FAR) and False Rejection Rate
(FRR). In anti-spoofing applications, FAR is the ratio of malicious attempts that
were not correctly recognized by the system, while FRR represents the ratio of real
accesses that were wrongfully classified as spoofing attacks[7]. Although the (HTER)
provides a balanced measurement about the achieved error rates, the critical nature
of the application gives an equal attention to (FAR) and (FRR), meaning that
if the identification system is of high critical functionality, for instance banking or
governmental purposes, then reducing the rates of correctly accepted frauds becomes
of greater importance even if that rejecting genuine users will be more frequent.
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4.4

Datasets

In this section we present and compare the two datasets that were employed in our
experiments, starting first with Idiap’s train dataset that was used in training the
texture analysis classifier and then second, the more balanced dataset that contains
two types of authentication methods and covers more lighting conditions.

4.4.1

Idiap’s Replay-Attack Dataset

Previously mentioned in Table 2.4, Idiap’s replay attack videos from the training
dataset were used as a base step in training the texture analysis SVM for classifying
videos from collected dataset. This dataset contained 360 videos with 60 real versus
300 attack attempts covering only 2 indoor illumination conditions, naturally and
artificially lit environments, Figure4.6.

Figure 4.6: Sample of images captured from real, 1st column and fake, 2nd and 3rd
columns, with 2 different illumination conditions
The replay-attack dataset is considered as an important baseline training video
dataset to a variety of anti-spoofing implementations proposed in the literature.
Unfortunately, known datasets with interactive authentication videos were not found
in the literature, therefore, collecting own dataset with interactive videos became
an important task for validating our proposed method.
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4.4.2

Collected Dataset

First, we needed to ensure that the anti-spoofing system is independent from the
surrounding environment lighting conditions, therefore, each user had recorded under
four different illumination conditions, sunny in an outdoor environment, an indoor
sunlit location, a room with average artificial light and finally, slightly dim indoor
scene, Figure 4.7 shows the resemblance of the appearance between the real and
attack images1 .

Since the collected dataset contains images of humans, it was

recommended and hence approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB).

Figure 4.7: Sample of images captured from real faces, replayed videos displayed on phone
screen and replayed videos from a tablet display, rows 1,2 and 3 consecutively.

This variation covers almost all the lighting conditions where the user could use
the face recognition process. Twenty-one users contributed in the collected data set,
8 videos were captured for each user covering all lighting conditions with the 2 types
of authentication, still and interactive. The attacks database, which contains the
replayed videos, was collected once using a phone device and another time using
a tablet, which makes the total number of videos in this dataset to 504 videos.
1

Collected data will be publicly available for the research community once finalized
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The recording protocol for the still dataset is also following the ICB’13 competition
with a 15 frames-per-second frame rate, 15 seconds video with a 320 × 240 screen
resolution. The challenge-response process follows the same frame rate and screen
resolution in addition to asking the user to move face in the four main directions
(up, down, left and right), figure 4.8, in a random order. Table 4.1 summarizes the
collected video dataset.

Figure 4.8: Head Motion Actions Examples
Table 4.1: Collected Dataset Summary
Still
20

4.5

Real
Interactive
20

Replay-Phone
Still Interactive
20
20

Replay-Tablet
Still Interactive
20
20

OpenCV

In this research, attention was drawn to use ready implementations of used algorithms
instead of remaking them from scratch, therefore OpenCV was the chosen API
for our implementation. This decision was achieved based on the robustness of
the library in handling real-time problems thanks to the optimized computational
implementations of existing algorithms such as calcOpticalFlowPyrLK the function
that implements the Lucas-Kanade optical flow feature tracking method, existing
frontal face haar classifiers, and Machine Learning Library for support vector machines,
in addition to multiple video and images optimized manipulation functions.
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Chapter 5
EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
In this section, we start our experiments by testing the efficiency of employing
only texture analysis on both still and interactive sessions using the micro-texture
approach, by applying local binary pattern over video frames and classifying using
a support vector machine (SVM). The performance of the interactive session is then
evaluated in the second experiment by calculating the action detection efficiency
and evaluating spoof attempts based on a set threshold the number of detected
actions and finally in the third experiment, we combine both texture analysis with
interaction to evaluate the results of the hybrid system using different fusion methods
starting with simple weighted sum to artificial neural networks (ANN) and support
vector machine (SVM). The following subsections describe in details methods of
implementation for each experiment, present results attained after each experimentation
and finally discuss some observations about these results.
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5.1

Experiment 1: Texture Analysis on Collected
Dataset

Objective
Our objective in this experiment is to validate the utilization of the texture analysis
only as the parameter for spoofing detection. In order to reach more realistic results,
we extended our dataset to include videos with extreme lighting conditions, varying
from direct sunlight to dim illumination environments.

Methods
We started our experiment first by feeding 256-bin LBP histograms of all videos
in the Idiap’s train dataset to a linear Support Vector Machine (SVM). Then, we
tested the SVM response over all collected videos, from both still and interactive
datasets, without any regard to interaction scores achieved by the user. With a
total of 252 videos. Table 5.1 summarizes the values achieved after applying this
experiment, while Tables 5.2 and 5.3 offer detailed descriptions of error rates under
different illumination conditions applied on both passive and interactive datasets.

Results
Table 5.1: Performance Results of Applying Only Texture Analysis, applied on both
datasets (in percentage)

Dataset
Still
Interactive

FRR FAR
5
77.5
5
80
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HTER
41.25
42.5

Table 5.2: Error Rates Percentages Distribution Under Different Illumination Conditions,
Passive Authentication Dataset
Illumination Condition
Sunny-Outdoors
Sunny-Indoors
Artificial Light
Dim Light

FRR FAR
0
20
0
25
0
20
5
15

HTER
10
12.5
10
10

Table 5.3: Error Rates Percentages Distribution Under Different Illumination Conditions,
Interactive Authentication Dataset
Illumination Condition
Sunny-Outdoors
Sunny-Indoors
Artificial Light
Dim Light

FRR FAR
0
20
0
25
0
17.5
5
15

HTER
10
12.5
8.75
10

Observations
We can clearly observe that only employing texture analysis as the only anti-spoofing
method does not produce satisfactory and accurate results. With an extremely high
false acceptance rate, it is becoming less desirable to consider only texture analysis
using local binary pattern as the anti-spoofing method. It is also noticeable that the
highest achieved error rates were scored with the sunny environments, which is based
on the fact that the Idiap dataset was relatively limited to controlled conditions.
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5.2

Experiment 2: Challenge-Response Interaction
Without Texture Analysis

Objective
The second experiment in this research tests the performance of employing challenge-response
interaction for achieving more accurate spoofing detection results. The main aim
in this experiment is to investigate the robustness of the identification system using
only an interactive authentication method without considering further anti-spoofing
methods such as texture-analysis using local binary pattern(LBP).

Method
In this experiment, each user’s face is identified using the opencv’s haar cascade
frontal face classifier.

Then the center point is detected for tracing.

Next, a

random-ordered series of actions are required from the user to perform using a
replayed audio message, after each challenge request, the face center point is tracked
using the Lucas-Kanade [25] tracking method. The angle of movement is then
processed to estimate the face motion direction by comparing the reference point
from frontal view to the last pose of the action point using the (atan) function.
Finally, a threshold was set depending of the number of correctly detected actions
as a parameter to differentiate between real and fake attempts.
Table 5.4 compares the error rates achieved with the variations of the threshold of
the number of successfully detected actions.
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Results
Table 5.4: Interactive Dataset Results (%)
# of Actions Detected Threshold FRR FAR
1
0
82.5
2
5
32.5
3
30
15
4
60
0

HTER
41.25
18.75
22.5
30

Observations
Promising results were achieved after employing interactive authentication. Half
Total Equal error rates significantly reduced comparing to the texture analysis. The
threshold set is inversely proportional to the false acceptance rates, the more actions
are required, the lower false acceptance rate. Reaching 0% when the four actions
are required, which was never applied with replayed videos. However, the drawback
of this implementation was the false rejection rate that considerably increased. It is
also concluded from this experiment that the most suitable and convenient number
of required actions from the user varies from 2-3 actions, both from accuracy and
user-friendliness perspectives.
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5.3

Experiment 3: Combining Texture Analysis
with Interaction

Objective
Finally in this experiment we combine both texture analysis with the interaction to
test the effectiveness of this combination over the spoofing detection performance.
In this experiment, we aim at eliminating the drawbacks of employing only texture
analysis which resulted high false acceptance rate in addition to discarding the
disadvantages of the interactive authentication mode that also scored high false
rejection rates. In this experiment, we also investigate different fusion methods in
an attempt to reach a conclusion about the most feasible classification approach that
produces the most accurate spoofing detection results by applying artificial neural
networks, support vector machine in addition to simple and basic weighted sum as
fusion methods.

5.3.1

Classification using Weighted Sum

Method
We calculated a weighted sum between the number of detected actions and the
SVM response, giving each action a weight of 15% and the texture analysis result
to be equal to 40% in order to get a total of 100%. Table 5.5 illustrates the
differences between accepting 2,3 and 4 detected actions in classifying between
real and attack attempts accompanied with the SVM texture analysis results. In
this experimentation, and in order to unify parameters to achieve fair comparison
between the 3 approaches, the same SVM used in experiment 1 is also used in this
experiment.
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Results
Table 5.5: Results achieved after combining both approaches, using Weighted Sum
# of Actions Detected FRR FAR
1
0
67.5
2
0
27.5
3
30
12.5
4
40
0

HTER
33.75
13.75
21.25
20

Observations
We can deduce from this experiment that the using simple combination did not
prove much further enhancement in the spoofing detection process. The effect
of combining texture + interaction system appeared more on the low number of
actions by enhancing the FAR, but for higher number of actions, the system did not
prove further score enhancement since the interactive system (without analyzing
the authentication session frames texture) was already secure with FAR = 0. We
can also note that although requiring 4 correct responses from the user achieved 0
% false acceptance rate, the fact that the extremely high false rejection error rate
makes it less desirable to employ in most common applications.

5.3.2

Classification using Artificial Neural Networks

Method
Although weighted sum has produced some valuable results, it is still considered a
simple or naive method that is not based on a solid classification pattern. Therefore
the focus in this and the upcoming section is to base our classification on a scientific
basis in order to validate our results.
In this experiment, we started by training a simple basic artificial neural network
with a small number of neurons on a very small number of hidden layers, we tested
one ANN’s with 2 hidden layers. The learning algorithm for this network was
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back-propagation, due to its presented promising learning results. The training set
of this experiment is from the collected data itself since it is the only one containing
videos with an interactive type of authentication, we started feeding the ANN with
80% of the achieved score of collected data real and replay attacks texture analysis
and challenge response interaction results.

Results
Table 5.6: Results achieved after combining both approaches with ANN (%)
ANN
AN N2HL

FRR FAR
20
10

HTER
10

Observations
We can deduce from this experiment that employing an artificial neural networks
with 2 hidden layers increased the accuracy result by reducing the HTER to 10%,
that is due to the back-propagation method that adaptively updates weights in order
to guarantee best possible performance. We can also deduce that by comparing with
weighted sum, the results are closely related, but are considered to be more reliable.

5.3.3

Classification using Support Vector Machine

Method
Another robust classifier was used to test the performance of the integration between
texture analysis and challenge response interaction. We only employed support
vector machine to compare its performance with ANN and the weighted sum in an
attempt to explore the most feasible and accurate method that guarantees the best
possible results.
Training the SVM was tightly related to the artificial neural network, where the
inputs were the two arguments or outputs of the proposed implementation: the
texture analysis based on the local binary pattern SVM classification and the number
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of correctly detected actions, in addition to the label list that labels each pair in the
training set with the target output. The training process took place over 80% of the
collected data set because, as mentioned before, it is the only dataset with interactive
types of videos. The used SVM is a linear SVM that separates between the two
classes based on the subcomponents outputs. The SVM was fed with the remaining
20% videos of the collected datasets where results are shown in the table5.7

Results
Table 5.7: Results achieved after combining both approaches with SVM (%)
ANN
SV M

FRR FAR
15
10

HTER
12.5

Observations
The output result closely matches the achieved scores of the ANN with 2 hidden
layers. Those results could be attained based on the fact that it is a relatively small
test dataset and the achieved results should not produce significant variations. The
main observation after performing this experiment is that the performance of a linear
support vector machine showed promising results, with a half-total equal error rate
minimized to 12.5%.
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Chapter 6
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE
WORK
6.1

Conclusion

Anti-spoofing is becoming a vital issue that follows biometric identification. The
ability of system to discover and prevent attackers is a highly critical matter especially
with the diverse variation of attacks that vary from printed or still images of the
authenticated user to the replay attacks where the impostor uses a replayed video
of the genuine user to get access to the system. Since the issue of still images are
resolved[5], our focus was drawn more to find a robust method to detect 2-d face
spoof attempts using replay videos from smart devices display.
In this study, we first investigated different spoofing approaches in the literature
attempting to overcome the issue of spoofing attempts starting first by the techniques
applied on passive or non-interactive authentication mode, where the user poses
still to the identification system capturing device without required interactions,
starting with analyzing the motion of the user and comparing it to the surrounding
environment, analyzing the difference and degradation of texture quality of recaptured
frames and discovering any signs of liveness such as eye blinking and mouth movements.
Afterwards, different fusion methods were investigated in case of integrating more
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than one spoofing detection method in a single system. Different spoofing prevention
using interactive authentication methods are then discussed. Finally we examined
the most important two competitions focusing on anti-spoofing techniques to acquire
detailed knowledge about the most successful methods that provide the highest
accuracy scores.
Later, the proposed method of integrating the analysis of video frames texture
with interactive authentication mode was presented in an attempt to develop an
anti-spoofing system robust to different sorts of attacks. First the texture analysis
that is applied using a simple Local Binary Pattern (LBP), the method that proved
to achieve the most accurate results in previous competitions. In addition to interaction
method that asks different face pose motion from user and compare challenge commands
with user’s response, starting first by detecting frontal face center point using
OpenCv’s Haar classifier, setting this point as the feature to track presented later
to the Lucas-Kanade tracking method and after certain frame count where the head
motion takes place, the difference between reference point and the tracked point is
used to calculated the angle of motion. The final step in the proposed method was
to merge the scores of the two approaches using a fusion method, where the achieved
results from weighted sum, Artificial Neural Network (ANN) and Support Vector
Machine (SVM) were examined and compared.
In consideration of the importance of face identification system and its involvement
in different real-life applications, a more balanced dataset covering more realistic
illumination environments was collected from 21 different users. For each user,
data collection took place on two categories, passive and interactive authentication
methods, under four different illumination conditions ranging from directed sunlight,
indoor sunlit, artificial lighting in an indoor environment, and dim conditions. This
is to test the efficiency of the proposed solution under uncontrolled conditions.
Following the collection of real access videos, another dataset was collected by
replaying these recordings using 2 personal devices, 10" tablet and smart phone
display. Totaling the number of collected videos to 504 recordings.
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Three main experiments where held in this study for exploring the efficiency of
our proposed solution. First experiment tested the performance of utilizing texture
analysis as the single spoofing detection method applying this algorithm over the two
datasets, still and interactive. Comparing both passive and interaction authentication
processes, interaction has proved better results than just relying on texture analysis.
Simply employing interaction has lowered the error rate with 30% comparing to the
still process.
Combining both approaches was applied on three different approaches. The first
approach, the weighted sum calculation where the weights were given arbitrarily
and without prior selection rational. However the achieved results were promising
in terms of reducing the HTER to as low as 7.7381% which was a better score than
the ones achieved by ANN and SVM, although the results produced by the classifiers
are not of high variation than the ones of weighted sum.

6.2

Future Plan

Our future plan can be summarized into expanding our dataset by recording more
users, this will help improving our results by training the support vector machine
with a wider variation of videos under more realistic environment in an effort to
improve the texture analysis classification. Enhancement for interaction could be
done by investigating other kinds of facial actions such as requested eye-blinking,
smile and other possible facial actions in order to prevent the chances of false
positives that will help attackers gaining illegitimate access to the face biometric
identification system. Research could be expanded by exploring different tracking
methods in order to investigate the chances of employing more accurate action
tracker thus enhancing the action detection process.
This study can be expanded by applying more diverse types of classifiers rather than
the linear support vector machine or expanding the number of hidden layers in the
artificial neural networks. Another contribution can be added by employing a wider
variety of training and testing parameters for the SVM and ANN in order to attain
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the most feasible and robust classification method.
Further enhancements for the proposed method can be achieved by adding the "Do
Not Know" feature in the proposed method in order to increase the accuracy level.
By setting two thresholds instead of only one, the system should be able to classify
with higher accuracy between genuine users and impostors. The thresholds will be
considered as upper and lower bound for classification whereas users with output
scores higher than the upper threshold should be considered with high confidence
level as real users and equally, attempts with output results below the lower threshold
are then perceived as impostors. Finally, authentication attempts with classification
results between the two thresholds will be labeled as "Do Not Know", consequently,
further actions or repeating the process could be asked from the user.
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